Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Supreme Court Case Files

Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers

10-1979

Aaron v. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Securities Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Aaron v. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 70.
Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Virginia.

This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme
Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM

r-·

October 12, 1979 Conference
List 1, Sheet 1
No. 79-66
Cert to CA 2
(Anderson, Feinberg,
& Timbers)

AARON

v.
SECURITIES & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
1.

SUMMARY:

Timely

Federal/Civil

This case raises the questions whether Sec. --;;::::::-.
17(a) of

--

the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77q(a), and Sec. lO(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15

u.s.c.

78j(b) (and Rule lOb-5 pro-

rnulgated thereunder) require proof of scienter in an injunctive proceeding brought by the Securities & Exchange Commission.
2.

FACTS:

---

-

In February 1976 the SEC filed a complaint against eight

defendants, including petr, alleging inter alia violations of the
anti-fraud provisions of Sec. 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Sec.
lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule lOb-5 in
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connection with the offer and sale of common stock of Lawn-A-Mat Chemical

\

& Equipment Corp. (Lawn-A-Mat). (The applicable statutory provisions and
regulation are included in the appendix attached hereto.)

Petr, who had

supervisory responsibility over the employees of a broker-dealer firm
registered with the Commission, allegedly violated the aider and abetter
provisions of the Securities Acts in that he knew or should have known
the employees of the broker-dealer firm were making materially false and
misleading representations in the offer and sale of Lawn-A-Mat stock, but
failed to take steps to prevent or terminate the fraudulent activity.
Following a three-day evidentiary hearing, the DC found that petr had
violated Sec. 17(a), Sec. lO(b), and Rule lOb-S : it enjoined him from
future violations of those provisions.
3.
(:

The CA affirmed.

CA DECISION: In reaching its decision, the CA held that neither

Sec. 17(a) nor Sec. lO(b) requires a showing of scienter when the government brings enforcement actions to enjoin violations of those sections.
TheCA first examined Sec. lO(b) in light of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185 (1976), which held that proof of scienter 1s a necessary
element in a private damage action under Sec. lO(b).

It noted that Ernst

explicitly left open the question whether scienter would be required in
future injunction actions.

425 U.S. at 194 n. 12.

It concluded that

allegations and proof of negligence alone will suffice for injunctive
relief under that Section.
The CA examined the factors relied on by this Court in Hochfelder: (1)
the language of Sec. lO(b): (2) the legislative history of the 1934 Act:
and (3) the relationship of Sec. lO(b) to the other express civil
remedies and the effect of a scienter requirement on the overall
."--"

statutory scheme of the securities laws.

The CA rejected the contention

that Hochfelder's analysis of the language of Sec. lO{b) should apply

- 3 -

c

with equal force to the question whether scienter is a requisite element
in a government injunction action.

After noting that different courts

have construed the language of Sec. lO(b) differently, it examined the
legislative history and purpose of the section.

It reasoned that (1) a

negligence standard should be applied in a government enforcement action
because such actions are brought to provide maximum protection for the
investing public, as contrasted with the purpose of private damage
actions which are brought to obtain monetary relief for individual investors, (2) Sec. 2l(d) indicates that scienter was not intended to be
required in SEC injunction actions

~/

and (3) the rejection of a

scienter requirement for SEC injunction actions is consistent with the
overall enforcement scheme of the securities acts.

The CA then noted that it follows a fortiori from its holding with
respect to the scienter requirement of Sec. lO(b) that scienter is not a
requisite element of a government enforcement action to ·enjoin violations
of Sec. 17(a).

After observing that other circuits are divided on the

issue whether Hochfelder should apply to actions brought under Sec.
noted
17(a), theCA 2Ahat it had previously determined unequivocally that
scienter is not required in such an action as a result of the absence

j/
"TheCA also noted that when Sec. 2l(d) was replaced by
Sec. 2l(e) in 1975, Congress expressly indicated its approval of
the approach taken by the CA 2 in not requiring a showing of
scienter for injunction actions brought under Sec. lO(b):
'Private actions frequently will involve more parties and more
issues than the Commission's enforcement action, thus greatly
increasing the need for extensive pre-trial discovery. In
particular, issues related to matters of damages, such as
scienter, causation, and the extent of damages are elements not
required to be demonstrated in a Commission injunctive action.'"
(Citation omitted) (Emphasis in original). S. R. Rep. No. 75,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1975).

- 4 -

c

in Sec. 17(a) of any terminology comparable to the words "manipulative or
deception" "device" or "contrivance" which the court found persuasive in
Hochfelder.
4.

SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1026-28 (2d Cir. 1078).

CONTENTIONS:

Petr contends the CA's holding that scienter is not

required under Sec. lO(b) conflicts with the interpretation of that
section adopted by the CA 5 in SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1333 (5th
Cir. 1978) and that its interpretation of Sec. 17(a) conflicts with the
CA 7's interpretation of that section in Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co.,
554 F.2d 790, 795-796 (7th Cir. 1977).

Petr notes that here the CA 2

found the language of Sec. lO(b) alone is not determinative of the issue
and thus resort to legislative history and purpose is proper.

The CA 2

also held that the policy considerations underlying the securities acts
clearly reflect that a negligence standard should be applied in government enforcement actions.

By contrast, the CA 5 on Blatt held that dis-

cussion of the language of Sec. lO(b) in Hochfelder conclusively demonstrates that scienter is a necessary element in government enforcement
actions.

It further stated that the language of the section was suffi-

ciently clear to be controlling notwithstanding considerations of public
policy.

The conflict between the CA 2 and CA 7 with respect to the

appropriate interpretation of Sec. 17(a), according to petr, is equally
apparent.
Petr next contends the decision below raises significant and recurring problems.

These are:

(1) Does this Court's analysis and holding

in Hochfelder under Sec. lO(b) and Rule lOb-S apply to SEC injunctive
proceedings? (2) Are the language and history of Sec. lO(b) dispositive
of the issue, or do arguments of policy and purpose control?

~)

and (3)

Should Sec. 17(a) be read in harmony with Hochfelder?
5.

DISCUSSION:

The issues presented are certworthy and the case

- 5 -

( ·

suitable for review.

'

.

In his response, the SG recommends

t~is

Court grant

review in light of the importance of the issues, the extraordinary amount
of time expended in litigating them, and the disagreement among the lower
courts.
There is a response.
10/3/79
CMS

C..~

Asperger

Op in petn.
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APPENDIX

Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the
offer or sale of any securitie~. .9Y .t~e use of any
means or instruments of transportation or
communication in . interstate commerce or by the
use of the mails, directly or indirectly -

•

•

(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud, or
•
(2) to obtain money or property by means of
any u~true statement of a material fact or any
omission to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or

G

(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or
course of business which operate$ or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser."

Section lO(b) of the Securities Excpange Act of 1934:

.. lt lshall be unlawful for any person, dire~tly
or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails. or of any facility of any national securities
exchange (b) To use or employ, in connection with the
purchase of sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors."

•• • - · ·

···.-- ..... _ .. _-""!!~""!.,.....-

Rule lOb-S:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly
or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities
exchange.
(I) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud,

(2) to make any untrue statement ~f a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course
of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security."
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The

question

1n

~~~

/7&._,

~t#f~~cr-~~-6.-t_

~ ~ t.M-~Jl_j_.jj

1

.A~~

}b

this

£--.. H-4..-..- 1 l) ..t-

intere-s U'Flgc a s e- is w~her

ne ~ d prove scie~ er in a proceeding for an injunction under
~f the

1934 Act and §17(a) of the 1933 Act.

the
§

~~
sE.g.

10(b) ~~

Some of the difficulty ~ ~r

"--'

with the case is that it presents the question with respect to both
statutory

memo

provisions,

will

examine

so

the

any

answer must

language

and

harmonize

legislative

the

two.

history

of

This
each

section, in turn.

I

In my view, your opinion for the Court
Hochfelder,
this

case

4 25 U.S.
with

1 85

respect

expressly reserved

to

( 1 976) ,
§

in ~nst &

should control

1 0 (b)

of

the

-----------------the quest ion pres en ted

Ernst v.

the disposition of

193 4 Act.
here.

Id. ,

That opinion
at

19 4 n. 1 2.

Hochfelder focused on the statute's use of "manipulative or deceptive
device
'--

or

contrivance"

as

reflecting

Congress'

intent

cienter to make out a violation of the provision.

drew

support

for

that

posit ion

from

~

the

to

require

The opinion also

admittedly

sketchy

2.

legislative

history of

§

10(b).

There

is no reason to depart now

from the analysis in Hochfelder.
The SEC, however, attempts to distinguish this case, arguing
that

Hochfelder

action,

while this

1934 Act.

~C

v.

suit

a
is

damage

suit

for

injunction under

an

under

an

implied

right

21 (d)

§

of

of
the

The SEC relies heavily on Justice Goldberg's opinion in

Capital

involved
1940.

involved

an

Gains

Research

equitable

action

Bureau,

under

the

3 75

U.s.

180

Investment

( 1 963),

Advisers

which
Act

of

------

The Court in Capital Gains ruled that the Commission did not

have to establish intent to deceive in order to obtain an injunction
compelling a registered investment adviser to disclose to his clients
the fact that he had just purchased shares in the corporation that he
·.,as

touting

to the clients.

proposition that
law]

"'Fraud

The opinion quotes a

has

a

broader meaning

in

treatise for the
equity

[than

at

and intention to defraud or to misrepresent is not a necessary

::::::::::n ::~~e:nt al:t3i.onsT:: ::: :::u::o:: it:i:quci:sye. for asimilar ~
I~-1~
.I

believe

instant case.

that

Capital

client."

is

distinguishable

The statutory provision in Capital Gains --

the Investment Advisers Act
operates

Gains

as a

banned "any

from

the

§ ~6

•1/f./

of ~.-

~

which ~
prospective l ~

• practice • • .

fraud or deceit upon any client or

~
~~
practice~~

This language contrasts fairly sharply with the terms of

10(b), especially in the Investment Advisers Act's focus on

that "operate" as a fraud.
legislative

history of

the

In addition, Capital ,Gains interprets the ~
Investment Advisers

Act

to

support

.Hf

its ~IJ~j

.nterpretation, while Hochfelder has already parsed the record of
10(b) to impose a scienter requirement.

1

§

~

3.

The SEC also presents policy considerations on its behalf.
Of course, Hochfelder held that there is no reason to look at policy
when the language and statutory history are clear.

In any event, the

Commission stresses the broad remedial purposes behind the 1934 Act
and the different nature of injunctive remedies as opposed to damages
liability

that was

at

issue

in Hochfelder.

Although

some superficial appeal to the SEC's argument here, it

there may be
~eems

fatuous

:iC

1-L

at this point in our history to view injunctive proceedings under the

----~--------------~--------~~----~-------

securities laws as

anything other than punitive.

There

can be no

~H --d·. ~

'~~

~

~~

doubt that protection of the public is a substantial purpose behind
such suits.
proceedings

~

injunctions.

Similarly, however,
have

serious

there

negative

is no doubt that

effects

on

the

injunctive

targets

of

the

~----~------------------,---------------------------------------

The

amicus

brief

for

the

Securities

-...

Industry

~

Association

points

out

that

under

§

15(b)

of

the

1934

Act,

administrative sanctions may be imposed on a broker-dealer if either
(1)

he

has

willfully

violated

the

securities

injunction has been entered against him.

laws,

15 U.S.C.

§

or

(2}

78o(b).

an

Amicus

argues that unless scienter is required for injunctive proceedings,
15 (b)

sanctions

showing
force,

of

may

willful

be

levied

against

misconduct.

would violate

This,

broker-dealers
amicus

the clear intent behind

without

§

any

with
some
it only

concludes
1 5 (b)

§

J

that

apply to intentional wrongdoing.
CA2 relied in substantial part on the amendment of
of

the

1934

authorizes

Act

an

is

in

1975.

injunction

engaged

or

15

U.S.C.

"[w]henever

is

about

§

The

78u(d).

in

person

to

engage

21(d}

§

provision

it shall appear

"

constituting a violation of this chapter • • •

that a

acts

or

practices

When it was revised

4.

in

1975,

damage

the

Senate
"In

actions:

damages,

Report

contrasted

particular,

injunctive

issues

related

proceedings
to

matters

with
of

such as scienter, causation and the extent of damages, are

elements not required to be demonstrated in a Commission injunctive

s.

action."

Rep. No.

in original) •
that

Congress

proceedings.

75, 94th Cong.,

The CA found
placed

no

this statement a

intent

I disagree.

1st Sess. 76

requirement

(1975)

compelling
in

§

1 0 (b)

(emphasis
indication
injunctive

Section 21(d) states that an injunction is

? '2_1&1.}
~

available to stop "acts or practices constituting a violation of

thi ~

chapter."

one.

Thus,

It

is

a

procedural

provision,

unless the challenged acts are

substantive

securities

law,

not

a

substantive

independent violations of the

gratuitous

remarks

in

the

legislative

'listory of a revision of a procedural provision cannot establish a
'--

different standard for finding a violation.

II.
The analysis of
to me.

§

17(a) of the 1933 Act seems more difficult

The language of the statute states:
"It shall be unlawful

for any person in the offer

or sale of any securities . . .
" ( 1)

to employ any device,

scheme or artifice to

defraud, or
" ( 2)

to obtain money or property by means of any

untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state
a material
made,

in

fact

the

necessary in order to make the statements

light of

the

circumstances

were made, not misleading, or

under

which

they

5.
" ( 3)
course

of

to

engage

business

in

which

any

transaction,

operates

or

fraud or deceit upon the purchaser."

practice,

would

operate

or

as

a

15 U.S.C. § 77q(a}.

The analysis of Hochfelder would seem to apply to§ 17(a}(1), which
uses the key terms
~ If)

---

"device,

6

terms ~ clearly

scheme or artifice to defraud."

convey the idea of scienter.

At a somewhat lower level

~

of certainty, § 17(a) (2) might be read in a similar way.
"obtain [ ing]" money might be seen to

negligent

17(a) (3),
clearly

as well

however,
reaches

as

there

intentional

is

no

negligent

doubt

as

The act of

include an element of intent,

although I must concede the provision might also be
include

Those

well

With

acts.

in

my

as

interpreted to
respect to
The

mind:

intentional

§

language

misconduct.

·1nfortunately, neither the CA nor the DC specified whether the petr
in

this

case

had

violated

a

particular

subsection of§

17(a),

so

there is no way of pinpointing the provision in dispute here.
There is a fairly strong basis for reading the subdivisions
at

issue

Naftalin,

here

as

441

u.s.

independent
768

In

provisions.

(1979),

this

Court

United

refused

States
to

v.

read

a

requirement in§ 17(a)(3) back into§ 17(a) (1}:
"The
the

satute

short

that

answer

way.

is

Indeed,

that Congress did not write
the

fact

that

it

did

not

provides strong affirmative evidence that while impact upon
a purchaser may be relevant to prosecutions brought under §
17 (a) ( 3),

it

17(a)(1).

As is

is

not

required

for

those

brought

indicated by the use of an

under

§

infinitive to

introduce each of the three subsections, and the use of the
conjunction

'or'

at

the

end

of

the

first

two,

each

6.
subsection
Each

proscribes

succeeding

kinds

of

dis tinct

prohibition

is

illegalities -- not

prior sections."
There

a

is

a

category

meant
to

to

of

misconduct.

cover

narrow the

additional

reach

of

the

Id., at 773-774 (footnote omitted).

spirited

dispute

in

the

briefs

over

the

significance of the deletion of the word "wilfully" from the final
version of§ 17(a).

Primarily for the reasons offered by the amicus

brief of the Securities Industry Association at pp. 17-18, I was not
especially

impressed

Nevertheless,

I

do

with

the

believe

that

significance
there

is

no

of

that

basis

for

scienter requirement into the language of§ 17(a) (3).
I believe this Court
0f

the

case

make

-

eithe ~ould
out

preferred course] , or

a

remand

reading

a

Consequently,

have to determine whether the facts

violation

@

deletion.

for

of

that

provision

[the

less-

that determination by the DC

[my

preferred course].
I have not had time to reflect fully on the impact that such
a reading of § 17(a) (3) will have.

Clearly, the SEC would then pitch

much of its enforcement effort toward that statute, but the provision
is limited to those selling securities, which is one of the reasons
why § 10(b) was added in 1934.

As a result, a certain asymmetry of

enforcement policy would develop, where negligent fraud by sellers of
securities would be punishable while negligent fraud by buyers would
not.

This

stronger

result

has

some

"fiduciary"-type

intuitive
relationship

securities seller and the public.
:hange the statute.

appeal,
between

since
a

there

is

a

professional

In any event, Congress can always

~((r-s-&9
~vU1rl~ ~~~~
~v-t-~~~~
~ ~&-t- ~~ u-( ~~~lA__,.

~~~·
( P~c;;. ~ :Ptz;:;{ ttJ~ ~~
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ERNST & ERNST v. HOCHFELDER
185

i:.'

Opinion of the Court

199

J Cj

lead, rt he Co
ission
D.t- would add a gloss to the operative
language of he statute quite different from its commonly accepted meaning.
See, e. g., Addison v. Hally
Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U. 8. 607, 617- 618 (1944). 10
The argument simply ignores the use of the words "manipulative," "device," and "contrivance"- terms that make
unmistakable a congressional intent to proscribe a type of
conduct quite different from negligence. 20 Use of the
word "manipulative" is especially significant. It is and
was virtually a term of art when used in connection with
securities markets. It connotes intentional or willful
conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities. 21
In addition to relying upon the Commission's argument with respect to the operative language of the stat10

"To let general words draw nourishment from their purpose is
one thing. To draw on some unexpressed spirit outside the bounds of
the normal meaning of words is quite another. . . . After all, legislation when not expressed in technical terms is addressed to the common run of men and is therefore to be understood according to the
sense of the thing, as the ordinary man has a right to rely on ordinary
words addressed to him." Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc.,
322 U. S., at 617-618. See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the
Reading of Statutes, 47 Col. L. Rev. 527,536-537 (1947).
20
Webster's International Dictionary (2d ed. 1934) defines "device"
as "[t]hat which is devised, or formed by design; a contrivance; an
invention; project; scheme; often, a scheme to deceive; a stratagem;
an artifice," and "contrivance" in pertinent part as "[a] thing contrived or used in contriving; a scheme, plan, or artifice." In turn,
"contrive" in pertinent part is defined as "[t]o devise; to plan; to
plot . .. [t]o fabricate ... design; invent ... to scheme ... ."
The Commission also ignores the use of the terms "[t]o use or
employ," language that is supportive of the view that Congress
did not intend § 10 (b) to embrace negligent conduct.
21
Webster's International Dictionary, supra, defines "manipulate"
as "to manage or treat artfully or fraudulently; as to manipulate
accounts . . . . 4. Exchanges . To force (prices) up or down, as
by matched orders, wash sales, fictitious reports ... ; to rig ."
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Dear Potter:
I find here, as with a half dozen of this week's cases,
that there are wide disparities in the basis of a majority
even when five or more agree on the result.
In this case you may recall my view that the Court of
Appeals decided the issue of scienter when it was not
necessary to do so.
(a) The District Court found scienter
but gratuitously went on to say "negligence of one may
suffice .
"; (b) the Court of Appeals did not disturb
the finding and indeed relied on it in part.
(See page 2la,
App. to Pet. For Cert.)
As I stated at Conference, the Court of Appeals opinion
goes beyond the need for a holding that negligence alone is
enough. For me, the issue I thought we had is not here.
I
therefore conclude to take that position, in which I am
joined by no one as of now.
In these circumstances, I
would remand to require the Court of Appeals to reconsider
its holding in light of there being no need to pass on the
scienter issue on this record.
Bill Brennan would affirm across the board; five votes
(without mine) were to vacate and remand but not on the same
basis as I think we should do so.
In light of this, I
would prefer to have you assign and my narrower ground for
remanding can be stated in co currence.

Mr. Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference
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Secunt1es an.d .Exchange
Comm1sswn.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeal~
for the Second Circuit.
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[April - , 1980]
MR. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is whether the Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission) is required to establish
scienter as an element of a civil enforcement action to enjoin
violations of§ 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act);
§ 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) 1
and Commission Rule 10b- 5 promulgated under that section
of the 1934 Act.

I

f

~;j~
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When the events giving rise to this enforcement proceeding
occurred, the petitioner was a managerial employee at E. L.
Aaron & Co. (the firm) , a registered broker-dealer with its
principfil office in New York City. Among other responsibilities at the firm, the petitioner was charged with supervising
the sal~s made by its registered representa.tives and maintaining
the so-?alled "due diligence" files for those securities in which
the firm ~erved as a market maker. One such security was
the cwnri1on stock of Lawn-A-Mat Chemical & Equipment
Corp. ,d Lawn-A-Mat) , a company engaged in the business of
selling lawn care franchises and supplying its franchisees with ~ ~
products and equipment.
L -~'~ ~ _r " · .
Between November 1974 and September 1975, two re~ -~
tered representatives of the firm, Norman Schreiber and Do,~ ~

~rj,~
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aid Jacobson, conducted a sales campaign in which they
repeatedly made false and misleading statements in an effort
to solicit orders for the purchase of Lawn-A-Mat common
stock. During the course of this promotion, Schreiber and
Jacobson informed prospective investors that Lawn-A-Mat
was planning or in the process of manufacturing a new type of
small car and tractor, and that the car would be marketed
within six weeks. Lawn-A-Mat, however, had no such plans.
The two registered representatives also made projections of
substantial increases in the price of Lawn-A-Mat common
stock and optimistic statements concerning the company's
financial condition. These projections and statements were
without basis in fact, since Lawn-A-Mat was losing money
during the relevant period.
Upon receiving several complaints from prospective investors, an officer of Lawn-A-Mat informed Schreiber and Jacobson that their statements were false and misleading and
requested them to cease making such statements. This
request went unheeded.
Thereafter, Milton Kean, an attorney representing LawnA-Mat, communicated with the petitioner twice by telephone.
In these conversations, Kean informed the petitioner that
Schreiber and Jacobson were making false and misleading
statements and described the substance of what they were
saying. The petitioner, in addition to being so informed by
Kean, had reason to know that the statements were false,
since he knew that the reports in Lawn-A-Mat's due diligence
file indicated a deteriorating financial condition and revealed
no plans for manufacturing a new car and tractor. Although
assuring Kean that the misrepresentations would cease, the
petitioner took no affirmative steps to prevent their recurrence. The petitioner's only response to the telephone ca:lls
was to inform Jacobson of Kean's complaint and to direct him
to communicate with Kean. Otherwise, the petitioner did
nothing to prev.e nt the two registered representatives under

7!9-66-0PINION
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his direct supervision from continuing to make false and
misleading statements in promoting Lawn-A-Mat common
lltock.
In February 1976, the Commission filed a complaint in the
District Court for the Southern District of New York against
the petitioner and seven other defendants in connection with
the offer and sale of Lawn-A-Mat common stock. In seeking
preliminary and final injunctive relief pursuant to § 20 (b)
of the 1933 Act and § 21 (d) of the 1934 Act, the Commission
alleged that the petitioner had violated and aided and abetted
violations of three provisions-§ 17 (a) of the 1933 Act, § 10
(b) of the 1934 Act, and Commission Rule 10b- 5 promulgated under that section of the 1934 Act. 1 The gravamen of
the charges against the petitioner was tha.t he knew or had
reason to know that the employees under his supervision were
engaged in fraudulent practices, but failed to take adequate
steps to prevent those practices from continuing. Before
commencement of the trial, all the defendants except the
petitioner consented to the entry of permanent injunctions
against them.
Following a bench trial, the District Court found that the
petitioner had violated and aided and abetted violations of
§ 17 (a.) , § 10 (b) , and Rule 10b-5 during the Lawn-A-Mat
sales campaign and en.ioined him from fut11re violations of
these provisions. 2 The District Court's finding of past violations was based unon its factual finding that the petitioner
had intentionally failed to discharge his supervisorv responsibility to stop Schreiber and Jacobson from making state1

The Commission also cha rged the petitioner anrl tlm•e other defendnnts
with violations of the registrati0n provisions of &§ 5 (a ) , (c) of th e 1933
Act , 15 U. S. C. §§ 77e (a), (c) (1976) . The District Court found that
the petition er had violat ed these provisions and enjoined him from future
violations. The Court of Appeals affirmed this holding. and the petitioner
has not. challenged this portion of the Court of Appea l's decision.
2 The opinion of the District Court is reported in F ed . Sec. L . R ep.

(eeH), at 1['96,04l;
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ments to prospective investors that the petitioner knew to be
false and misleading. Although noting that negligence a.Ione
might suffice to establish a violation of the relevant provisions
in a Commission enforcement action, the District Court concluded that the fact that the petitioner "intentionally failed
to terminate the false and misleading statements made by
Schreiber and Jacobson, knowing them to be fraudulent, is
sufficient to establish his scienter under the securities laws."
As to the remedy. even though the firm had since gone bankrupt and the petitioner was no longer working for a brokerdealer, the District Court reasoned that injunctive relief
was warranted in light of "the nature and extent of the violations ... , the [petitioner's] failure to recognize the wrongful
nature of his conduct and the likelihood of the [petitioner]
repea.ting his violative conduct."
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
judgment. SEC v. Aaron, 605 F. 2d 612. Declining to reach
the question whether the oetitioner's conduct would su ort
a fin mg of scienter, the Court of Appeals held i~Rtead that
wllen the Commission is seekin '·Injunctive relief "proof of
neg 1gence a one wil snffige" to esteblish violation of
§ 17 (a), § 10 (b). and Rnle 10b-5. /d., at 619. With rega.rd
to § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5. the Court of Apoeals noted that
this Court's opinion in Ernst & Ernst v. H ochfelder, 425 U. S.
185, which held that an allegation of scienter is necessarv to
·state a private cause of action for damages under § 10 (b)
and Rule 10b-5. had expressly reserved the question whether
scienter must be alleged in a suit for injunctive relief brought
by the Commission. /d., at 194. n. 12. The conch1sion of the
Court of Appeals that the scienter requirement of Hochfelder
does not apply to Commission enforcement proceedings was
said to find sunnort in the language of § 10 (b). the legislative
history of the 1934 Act. t;he relationship between § 10 (b) and
the overall enforcement scheme of the securities laws, and the
"compelling distinctions between ,private ·actions and govern-
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ment injunction actions." 3 For its holding that scienter is
not a necessary element in a Commission injunctive action to
enforce § 17 (a) , the Court of Appeals relied on its earlier
decision in SEC v. Coven, 581 F. 2d 1020. There that court
had noted that the language of § 17 (a) contains nothing to
suggest a requirement of intent and that, in enacting§ 17 (a),
Congress had considered a scienter requirement. but instead
"opted for liability without willfulness, intent to defraud. or
the like." ld., at 1027-1028.4 Finally, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the District Court's holding that, under all the facts
and circumstances of this case. the Commission was entitled
to injunctive relief. 605 F. 2d. at 62:3.---624.
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the federal
courts as to whether the Commission is required to establish
scienter-an intent on the part of the defendant to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud 5-as an element of a Commission
5 The Court of Apprals observed that its previous drcisions had required
scirnter in private damagr actions tmder § 10 (b) rvrn before this Court's
drcision in the Hochfelder casr, but also had "uniformly .. . hrld that the
language and history of the section did not requirr a showing of scienter in
an injunction action brought b~' the Commis~ion." 605 F . 2d, a.t 620-621.
This distinction had been prcmisNl on t11e fact that the two types of suits
under § 10 (b) advance different goals: actions for damngrs nre designed
to provide compensation to individual investors, whereas suits for injunctive
relirf serve to provide maximum protection for the investing public. In
the presrnt case, t.lw Court. of Appeals, relying on its reasoning in previous
cnses, concluded that "[i]n view of the policy considerations underlying
the securities acts, . .. the increasE'd effE'rtivE'ness of govrrnm~>nt, enforcement actions predicated on a showing of n~>gligence alone outweigh [s]
the danger of potential harm to those enjoined from violating the securities laws." !d., at 621.
o~. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals gave any indication of which subsection or subsections of § 17 (a) of the 1933 Act the
petitioner had violated.
5 The term "scienter" is used throughout this opinion, as it was "in
Emst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, at 193, 11. 12, to refer to "a
ment.al state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or drfraud." We
have nq occasion here to address the question, reserved in Hochfelder,

I
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enforcement action to enjoin violations of § 17 (a), 6 § 10 (b),
and Rule lOb- 5. 7 444 U. S. 914.

II
The two substantive statutory provisiOns at issue hereY
are § 17 (a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77q (a), and § 10
(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b). Section 17 (!) ,
which applies only to sell!(rs,.provides:
-;,It shall be--unlawful for any person in the offer or sale
of any securities by the use of any means or instruments
of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the ma.ils, directly or indirectly" ( 1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
" (2) to obtain money or property by means of any
untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
" ( 3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon the purchaser."
Section 10 (b) , which applies to both buyers and sellers,

....___..

./

ibid., wlwthcr, under some circumi;tances, scienter may abo include recklrss behavior.
G Com]JHrC', e. g., the present case, and SEC v. Coven, S81 F . 2d 1020
(CA2 197b) (ticienter not required in Commi~:sion enforcement action
under §17(a )(1) - (3)) , with Steadman v. SEC, 603 F . 2d 1126 (CAS
1979) (srient er required in Commission enforcement a.ction under § 17
(:1)( 1), but not under§ 17 (a )(2) - (3)) , and with SEC v. Cenco, 436 F .
Supp. Hl :~ (ND Ill . 197i) (sciente r required in Commission enforcement
action under§ 17 (a) (1) - (3)) .
7 Compan·, e. g., the present case, and SEC v. World Radio Mission,
Inc. , 544 F . 2d 535 (CAl 1976) (scienter no t required in Commission
enforcrment. action under § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5) , with SE C v. Blatt, .
.'1-83 U. S. 1325 (CAS 1978) (scienter required in Commission enforcement
ao tion lUJQer § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-S) ..

'

.
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makes it "unlawful for any person . . . [ t] o use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors." Pursuant to its rulemaking
er this section, the Commission promulgated
Rule lOb-5, hich now provides:
s all be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
''(a) To employ any device, scheme, artifice to defraud,
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact
or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
" (c) To engage in any a.ct, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person,
"in connection with the sale or purchase of any security."
17 CFR ~ 240.10b-5 (1979).

l

The civil enforcement mechanism for these provisions consists of both express and implied remedies. The express
remedy is a suit by the Commission f r 'n · unctrverelief.
Sec 10n 20 ( o t e
Ac,
. S.C.§ 77t (b), provides:
''Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any
person is engaged or about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of the
provisions of this subchapter [e. g., § 17 (a)], or of any
rule or regulation prescribed under the authority thereof,
it may in its discretion, bring an action in any district
court of the United States ... to enjoin such acts
or practices, and upon a proper showing a permanent or
temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted
without bond."

79-66--0PINION
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Similarly, § 21 (d) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78u (d),
authorizes the Commission to seek injunctive relief whenever
it appears that a person "is engaged in or is about to engage
in any acts or practices constituting" a violation of the 1934
Act, [e. g., § 10 (b)], or regulations promulgated thereto,
[e. g., Rule 10b-rf,\J, ancl requires a district court "upon a
proper showing" to grant injunctive relief.
The other facet of civil ~nforcement is a 12rivate cause of
action for money damages. This remedy, unlike the Commission injunctive action, is not expre~ authorized by statute, but rather has been jud!cially implied. See Ernst & Ernst
v. H ochfeza;;::-;upra, :t25'U:" S., at 19'6"-197. Although this
Court has repeatedly assumed the existence of a1"Wmplied
cause of action under § 10(9,1 and Rule 10b-5, see Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, supra;'f3lue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 730; Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U. S. 128, 150-154; Superintendent of Insurance v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U. S. 6, 13, n. 9, it has not had
occasion to address the question whether a private cause of
action <'Xists under § 17 (a). See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, supra, at 733, n. 6.
The issue here is whether the Commission in seeking injunctive relief either under § 20 (b) for violations of § 17 (a), or
under ~ 21 (d) for violations of § 10 (b) or Rule 10b-5, is
required to establish scienter. Resolution of that issue could
depend upon (1) the substantive provisions of § 17 (a), § 10
(b) , and Rule 10b-5, or (2) the statutory provisions authorizing injunctive re-lief "upon a proper showing," § 20 (b) and
§ 21 (d). We turn to an examination of each to determine
thP extPnt to which they may require proof of scienter.
A
In determining whether scienter is a necessa.ry element of
a violation of § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5, we do not write qn a
clean slate. Rather, the starting point f or our inquiry is
Ernst & Ernst v. Hocl~felder, 425 U. S. 185, a case in which

1
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tbe Court concluded that a private cause of action for damages
·will not lie under § 10 (b) and Rule lOb- 5 in the absence of
·a n allegation of scienter. Although the issue presented in the
present case was expressly reserved in H ochfelder, id. , at 193,
n. 12, we nonetheless !!!_Ust_Ee guided by the reasoning of that
decision. ~
~ conclusion in Hochfelder that allegations of simple
negligence could not sustain a private cause of action for
damages under § 10 (b) a·nd Ru1e 10b- 5 rested on several
grounds. The most important was the plain meaning of the
language of § 10 (b). It was the view of the Court that the
terms "manipulative," "device/ ' and "contrivance"-whether
given their commonly accepted meaning ot tead as terms of
art- quite clearly evinced a congressional intent to proscribe
only "knowing or intentional misconduct.'" Id., at 197-199.
This meaning, in fact, was thought to be so unambiguous as
to suggest that "further inquiry may be unnecessary." /d.,
at 201.
The Court in H ochfelder nonetheless found additional support for its holding in both the legislative history of § 10 (b)
and the structure of the civil liability provisions in the 1933
and 1934 Acts. The legislative history, though "bereft of any
explicit explanation of Congress' intent," contained "no indication ... that § 10 (b) was intended to proscribe conduct not
involving scienter." /d., 201- 202. Rather, as the Court
noted, a spokesman for the drafters of the predecessor of
§ 10 (b) described its function as a "catch-all clause to prevent
manipulative devices." /d., at 202. This description, as well
as various passa~~;es in the Committee Reports concerning the
evils to which the 1934 Act was directed, evidenced a purpose
to proscribe only knowing or intentional misconduct. Moreover, with regard to the structure of the 1933 and 1934 Acts,
the Court observed that in each instance in which Congress
had expressly created civil liability, it had specified the standard of liability. To premise civil liability U11der § 10 (b) ori
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merely negligent conduct, the Court concluded, would run
counter to the fact that wherever Congress intended to accomplish that result, it said so expressly and subjected such actions
to significant procedural restraints not applicable to § 10 (b).
!d., a.t 206-211. Finally, since the Commission's rulemaking
power was necessarily limited by the ambit of its statutory
authority, the Court reasoned that Rule 10b-5 must likewise
be restricted to conduct involving scienter. 8
In our view the' rationale of HJ2.ch[elder ineluctabl:t: le~ds
to he conclusion that scienter is an ele ent of a viol · of
§ 1 ~ -5, regardless of t..he identity of the
plamtiff or the nature of the ""i-elief SoUght. Two of the three
fa"Ctors I~i"nllodijelae;:::_the language of § 10 (b)
and its legislative history-are applicable whenever a violation of § 10 (b) or Rule 10b-5 is alleged, whether in a private
cause of action for damages or in a Commission injunctive
action under§ 21 (d). 9 In fact, since Hochfelder involved an
implied cause of action that was not within the contemplation
of the Congress that enacted § 10 (b), id., at 196, it would be
quite anomalous in a case like the present one, involving as it
does the express remedy Congress created for § 10 (b) violations, not to attach at least as much significance to the fact
that the statutory language and its legislative history support
a scienter requirement.
The Commission argues that H ochfelder, which involved a
The Court in Hochfelder also found support. for its conclusion as to
the scope of H.ule lOb-5 in the fact that the administrative history revealed
that "when the Commission adopted the Rule it was intended to apply
only to activit.;es that involved scienter." 425 U. S., at 212.
9 The third factor-the structure of civil liability provisions in the 193:l
and 1934 Acts-obvicusly has no applicability in a case involving injunctive relief. It is evident, however, that the third factor was not determinative in Hochfelder. Rather, the Court in Hochfelder clearly indicat·e d
that the language of the statute, which is applicable here, was sufficient,
standing alone, to support the Court's conclusion that scienter is required'.
~n a private damage action 1;1:.11d'er po (b,). 42.5 U. S., at 201,
8

).

1
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private cause of action for damages, is not a proper guide
in construing § 10 (b) in the present context of a Commission
enforcement action for injunctive relief. We are urged instead
to look to SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U. S.
180. That case involved a suit by the Commission for injunctive relief to enforce the prohibition in § 206 (2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. § 80b-6, against any
act or practice of an investment adviser that "operates as a
fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client." The
injunction sought in Capital Gains was to compel disclosure
of a practice known as "scalping," whereby an investment
adviser purchases shares of a given security for his own
account shortly before recommending the security to investors as a long-term investment, and then promptly sells the
shares at a profit upon the rise in their market value following
the recommenda.tion.
The issue in Capital Gains was whether in an action for
injunctive relief for violations of § 206 (2) 10 the Commission
must prove that the defendant acted with an intent to defraud.
The Court held that a showing of intent was not required.
This conclusion rested upon the fact that the legislative history revealed tha.t the "Investment Advisers Act of 1940 ...
reflects a congressional recognition 'of the delicate fiduciary
nature of an investmen_t \f~visory relationship,' as well as a

~orizing

to The statutory provision
injunctive relief involved in the
Capital Gains case was § 209 (e) of the Investment Advi::;ors Act, 15
U.S. C.§ 80b-9 (e), which provides in relevant part:
"Whenever it shall appear to the Commis::;ion that. any person has engaged, is engaged, or is about to engage in any act or practire constituting
a violation of any provision of this subchapter, or of any rnle, regulation,
or order hereunder, ... it may in its discretion bring an action in the
proper distt·ict court of the United States ... to enjoin such act:; or
practices and to enforce compliance with this subchapter or any rule,
regulation, or order hereunder. Upon a proper showing that Fuch person
has engaged, is engaged, or is about to engage in any such act or practice, ... , a permanent or temporary injunction or decree or restraining
order shall be granted without bond."
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congressional intent to eliminate, or at least to expose, all
conflicts of interest which might incline an investment adviser-consciously or unconsciously-to render advice which
was not disinterested." 375 U. S., at 191-192 (footnote
omitted). To require proof of intent, the Court reasoned,
would run counter to the expressed intent of Congress.
The Court added that its conclusion was "not in derogation
of the common law of fraud." !d., at 192. Although recognizing that intent to defraud was a necessary element at common law to recover money damages for fraud in an arm'slength transaction, the Court emphasized that the Commission's action was not a suit for damages. but rather a suit for
an injunction in which the relief sought was the "mild prophylactic" of requiring a fiduciary to disclose his transactions
in stocks he was recommending to his clients. !d., at 193.
The Court observed that it was not necessary in a suit for
"equitable or prophylactic relief" to establish intent, for
"[f]raud has a broader meaning in equity [than at law] and
intention to defraud or to misrepresent is not a necessary
element." ld., quoting De Funiak, Handbook of Modern
Equity 235 (2d ed. 1956). Moreover, it was not necessary,
the Court said, in a suit against a fiduciary such as an investment adviser, to establish all the elements of fraud that would
be required in a suit against a party to an arm's-length transaction. Fina.lly, the Court took cognizance of a "growing
recognition by common-law courts that the doctrines of fraud
and deceit. which developed around transactions involving land
and other tangible items of wealth are ill-suited to the sale
of such intangibles as advice and securities. and that. accordingly, the doctrines must be adapted to the merchandise in
issue." !d., at 194. Unwilling to assume that Congress was
unaware of these developments at common law. the Court
concluded that they "reinforce [d]" its holding that Congress
had not sought to require a showing of intent in actions tCl>
enjoin violations of § 2U6 (~). lld., at 19"5,

..
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The Commission argues that the emphasis in Capital Gains
upon the distinction between fraud at law and in equity should
guide a construction of § 10 (b) in this suit for injunctive
relief.1 1 We cannot, however, draw such guidance from
Capital Gains for several reasons. First, wholly apart from
its discussion of the judicial treatment of "fraud" at law and
in equity, the Court in Capital Gains found strong support in
the legislative history for its conclusion that. the Commission
need not demonstrate intent to enjoin practices in violation
_• H
of § 206 (2). By contrast, as the Court in Hochfelder noted,
(f~·
the legislative history of§ 10 (b) poinU; towar~ a scienter A_~
requirement. Second, it is quite clear that the anguage in
question in Capital Gains, "any ... practice . . . w ich operates
as a fraud or deceit," (emphasis added) focuses not on the
intent of the investment adviser, but rather on the effect of
a particular practice. Again, by contrast, the Court in H ochfelder found that the language of § 10 (b)-particularly the
t rrms "manipulative," "device." and "contrivance."-c]early
refers to "knowing or intentional misconduct." Finally,
insofar as Capital Gains involved a statutory provision regulating the special fiduciary relationship between an investment adviser and his client, the Court there was dealing with

- - :;v

u The Commission finds further support for its interpretation of § JO
(b) as not requiring proof of scienter in injunctive proceedings in the
fa ct that Congress was expressly informed of the Commission 's interpretation on two occasions when significant. amendments to the securities
laws were enacted-the Securities Act. Amendment;; of J975, Pub. L. No.
94-29, 89 Stat. 97, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub.
L. No. 95-21 3, 91 Stat. 1495-and on each occaEion C0ngress left the
administrative interpretation undisturbed . See S. Rep . No. 94-75 , 94th
Cong .. l st Sess., 76 (1976); H. R. R ep. No . 95-640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.,
10 (1977) . But, since the legislative consideration of those statutes wa s
addressed principally to matters other than that at issue here , it. is our
view that the failure of Congress to overturn the Commission's interpretation falls far short of providing a. basis to support a. construction of
§ 10 (b) so clearly at odds with it:s plain meaning and legi:slative history.
See SEC v. Sloan , 436 U.S . 103, 119- 121.
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a situation in which intent to defraud would not have been
required even in a common-law action for money damages. 12
~ection 10 (b), unlike the provision at issue in Capital Gains,
applies with equal force to both fiduciary and nonfiduciary
transactions in securities. It is our view, in sum, that the
controlling precedent here is not Capital Gains, but rather
H ochfelder. Accordingly, we conclude that scienter is a necessary element of a viola.tion of § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5.

In determining whethesf scienter is a necessary element of a violation of § 17 (a) there is less precedential
s. But the controlling prinauthority in this Court to ·
ciples are well settled. Though cognizant that "Congress
intended securities legislation enacted for the purpose of
avoiding frauds to be construed 'not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes,' "
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, supra, at 151, quoting,
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, supra, at 195, the
Court has also noted that <(generalized references to the
'remedial purposes' " of the securities laws "will not justify
reading a provision 'more broadly than its language and sta.tutory scheme reasonably permit.'" Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 578, quoting, SEC v. Sloan, 436'
U. S. 103, 116. Thus, if the language of a provision of the
securities laws is sufficiently clear in its context and not at
odds with the legislative history, it is unnecessary "to examine the additional considerations of 'policy' ... that may have
The Court, in Capital Gaius concludt>d: "Thus, even if we were to
agree with the courts below that. Congress had intended, in effect, to
codify the common law of fraud in the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, it
would be logical to conclude that CongretiS ccdified the common law
'renwdially' as the co'Urts had adapted it to the prevention of jraudule11t
securities transactions by fid'Uciaries, not 'technically' a:; it hws traditionally
been applied in damage suit:; between partie:; to arm's-length tran:;actions·
jpvolving land and ordi)iJ:m:y chattels."' 37,5 U. S_:., at 195 (emphwsis added).
12
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influenced the lawmakers in their formulation of the statute."
Ernst & Ernst v. H ochfelder, supra, at 214, n. 33.
The language of § 17 (a.) strongly suggests that Congress
contemplated a scienter requirement under § 17 (a) (1), but
not under § 17 (a.)(2) or § 17 (a)(3). The language of § 17
(a)(1), which makes it unlawful "to employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud," plainly evinces an intent on
the part of Congress to proscribe only knowing or intentional
misconduct. Even if it be assumed that the term "defra.ud"
is ambiguous, given its varied meanings at law and in equity,
the terms "device," "scheme," and "artifice" all connote knowing or intentional practices. 18 Indeed, the term "device,"
which a.lso appears in § 10 (b), figured prominently in the
Court's conclusion in H ochfelder that the plain meaning of
§ 10 (b) embraces a scienter requirement. 14 !d., at 199.
By contrast, the language of § 17 (a)(_2), which prohibits
any person from o6taining money or property "by means of
any untrue s~atement .of a ~aterial fact or a.I:lY omission to
state a matenal fact," IS devoid of any suggestiOn whatsoever
of a :::;cieuter requirement. As a well-known commentator has
noted, "[t]here is nothing on the fa.ce of Clause (2) itself
which smacks of scienter or intent to defraud." III__b._;hoss,
Secnrities Regulation 1442 (2d ed. 1961). In fact, this Court
in H ochfelder pointed out that the s;milar language of Rule
10b-5 (b) "could be read as proscribing . . . any type of
material misstatement or omission ... that has the effect of

l

Webster's International Dictionary (2d ed. 1934) defines (1) "device" as "rtlhat which is devh;rd, or formrd by drsign; a contrivance; an
invention; project; scheme: often, a scheme to deceive; a stratagrm: an
artJice," (2) "scheme" as "[a] plan or program of something to be done;
an cnterpri~:;c; l1 project: as, a businc::;s scheme [, or] [a] crafty, unethical
pro,iect," and (3) "artifice" as l1 "[c]raft.y device; trickery; abo, an
artful stratngrm or trick; artfulness; ingeniousness."
14
In addition, thr Court in Hochfelde1' noted that the term "to employ,"
which appears in both § 10 (b) and § 17 (a)(1), is ":suwortive of the
virw that Congress did not intend § 10 (b) to embrace negligent condud .."·
425' U. S., at 199, n .. 20 ..
13
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defrauding investors, whether the wrongdoing was intentional
425 U. S., at 212.
Finally, the language of · 17 (a) (3 under which it is
unlawful for any person "to 1
·
any transaction , practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit," (emphasis added) quite plainly focuses
upon the effect of particular conduct on members of the
investing public, rather than upon the culpability of the person responsible. This reading follows directly from Capital
Gains, which attributed to a similarly worded provision in
§ 206 (2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 a meaning
that does not require a "showing [of] deliberate dishonesty as
a condition precedent to protecting investors." 375 U. S., at
200.
It is our view, in sum. that the language of§ 17 (a) requires
scienter under§ 17 (a)(1) , but not under~ 17 (a)(2) or§ 17
(a) (3). Although the parties have urged the Court to adopt a
uniform culpability requirement for the three subparagraphs
of § 17 (a) , the language of the section is simply not amenable
to such an interpretation. This is not the first time that this
Court ha5 had occasion to emphasize the distinctious among
the three subparagraphs of § 17 (a). In United States v.
Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768, 774, the Court noted that each subparagraph of § 17 (a) "proscribes a distinct category of misconduct. Each succeeding prohibition is meant to cover additional kinds of illegaiities-not to narrow the reach of the
prior sections." (Footnote omitted .) Indeed, since Congress
drafted § 17 (a) iu such a manner as to compel the conclusion that scienter is required under one subparagraph but not
under the other two, it would take a very clear expression in
the legislative history of congressional intent to th e contrary
to justify the conclusion that the statute does not mean what
it so plainly seems to say.
We find no such expression of congressional intent in th e
legislatiYe history. The provisions ultimately enacted as

"r not."
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§ 17 (a) had their genesis in § 13 of identical bills introduced

simultaneously in the House and Senate in 1933. H. R. 4314,
73d Coug., 1st Sess. (Mar. 29, 1933); S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. (Mar. 29, 1933). 1 5 As originally draJted, § 13 would
have made it unlawful for any person
"willfully to employ any device, scheme. or artifice to
defraud or to obta.in money or property by means of any
false pretense, representation, or promise, or to engage
in any transaction, practice, or course of business ...
which operates or would operate as a fraud upon the
purchaser."
Hearings on these bills were conducted by both the House
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee and the Senate
Banking and Currency Committee.
The House and Senate Committees reported out different
versions of § 13. The Sena.te Committee expanded its ambit
by including protection against the intentionally fraudulent
practices of a "dummy," a person holding legal or nominal
title but under a moral or legal obligation to act for someone
else. As amended by the Senate Committee, § 13 made it
unlawful for any person
"willfully to employ any device, scheme, or artifice or to
employ any 'dummy,' or to act as any such 'dummy.' with
the intent to defraud or to obtain money or property by
means of any false pretense, representation , or promise,
or to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of
business . .. which operates or would operate as a fraud
upon the purchaser .... "
See S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 27, 1933); S. Rep.
No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 4-5 (1933). The House Committee retained the original version of § 13, except that the
word "willfully" was deleted from the beginning of the provi1 " During the House hearings, H . R. 5480 was substitu ted for H . R.
4314. .See H. R 5480, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (May 4, 1933).
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sion. 1 " See H. R. 5480, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., § 16 (a) (May 4,
1933). It also rejected a suggestion that the first clause, "to
employ any device, scheme, or artifice," be modified by the
phrase, "with intent to defraud." See ibid.; Federal Securities Act: Hearings on H. R. 4314 before the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 146
(1933). The House and Senate each adopted the version of
the provision as reported out by its Committee. · The Conference Committee then adopted the House version with a
minor modification not relevant here, see H. R. Conf. No. 152,
73d Cong., 1st Sess., 12, 27 ( 1933), and it was later enacted
into law as§ 17 (a) of the 1933 Act.
The Commission argues that the deliberate elimination of
the language of intent reveals that Congress considered and
rejected a scienter requirement under all three clauses of
§ 17 (a). This argument, however, rests entirely on inference,
for the Conference Report sheds no light on what the Conference Committee meant to do about the question of scienter
under § 17 (a). 11 The legislative history thus gives rise to
the equally plausible inference that the Conference Committee
concluded that (1) in light of the plain meaning of § 17
(a)(1), the language of intent-"willfully" and "with intent
to defraud"-was simply redundant, and (2) with regard to
Hl The Hou:;e Committee ahm renumbered § 13 as § 16 (a), divided the
provision into three subparAgraphs. and modified the lnngiiHge of the
~ccond subparagraph in a manner not relevant here. See H . R 5480, 73d
Cong .. M Sess., § 16 (a) (May 4, 19:m.
17 Although explaining that the "dummy" provision in the Senate bill
was deleted from § 13 becau~E' it was substituted in mcdifi ed form el~·e
where in the statute, H. R. Conf. Rep. No . 152, 73d Cong ., 1st S e~s . , 27
(193:3), the Conference Report contained no explanation of why the Confrrencc CommittE>e acquiesced in the decision of the Hou~r to delete the
word '·willfully" from § 13. That the CommittE'e faiiE>d to exp 1ain why it
followed the House bill in this rrgard is not in it:;elf significant, sincr the
C'r•nference Report, by it::; own terms. purported to di ;;cu ~s only the
"ditferl'nces between the House bill and the substitute agreed upon by thP
confPrE>es." !d., at 24. The deletion of the wcrd " willfully" was common
to both the Hot\Se bill und the CorlferencE> sub;;titiAte.
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§ 17 (a)(2) and § 17 (a.)(3), a. "willful[ness]" requirement
was not to be included. It seems clear, therefore, that the
legiElative history, albeit ambiguous. may be read in a manner
entirely consistent with the plain meaning of § 17 (a)." In
the absence of a. conflict between reasonably plain meaning
a.nd legislative history, the words of the statute must preva.il. 1 u

c
There remains to be determined whether the proviSions
authorizing injunctive relief, § 20 (b) of the 1933 Act and
§ 21 (d) of the 1934 Act, modify the substantive provisions
at issue in this case so far as scienter is concerned.
The language a.nd legislative history of ~ 20 (b) a.nd § 21 (d)
both indicate that Congress intended neither to add to nor
detract from the requisite showing of scienter under the
substtmtive provisions at issue. Sections 20 (b) a.nd 21 (d)
provide that the CommiEsion may seek injunctive relief whenever it appears that a person "is engaged in or ris l about to
eng·age in any acts or practices" constituting a violation of the
1933 or 1934 Acts or regulations promulgated thereunder and
that, "upon B nroper showing," a district court shall grant the
injl'nction. The elements of "a proper showing" thus include,

l

s ThP C0mmit:sicn, in further o·uppcrt of its view that scienter is not
required under any of the subpant!!'rHphs of § 17 (a) , points out that
§ 17 (a) wa::; patterned upon New York's Martin Act, N. Y. Gen. Bus.
Law §§ 352-35:3 (1921), and that the New York Court. of AJ)peals had
con~trued the Martin Act. as not requiring a :;bowing of ~cientcr as a
prcdirate for in.iunctiw relief by the New York Attorney General.
1

People ,.. Federated Radio Corp., 244 N. Y. 33, 154 N. E. 655 (1926).
But, in the nb8ence of any indicntion that Congres:; was even aware of the
Federated Radio .d <'ri:::ion, much less that it approved ef that decision, it
cannot fairly be inferred that Congre1'R intended not only to adopt the
language of the : \1artin Act, but also a state judicial interpretation of
t.hat. statutr at odd:; with the plain meaning of the language Congres:; enacted a:; § 17 (a) (1) .
19 Since the language and legislative history of § 1i (a) arc clis po~itivc,
we have no occasion to address the "policy" argument~ advanced by the

parties. See Ernst & Ernst "· Hochjelder, 425 U. S. 185, 214, n. 3iL
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at a minimum, proof that a person is engaged in or is about
to engage in a substantive violation of either one of the Acts
or of the regulations promulgated therf'u ncler. Accordingly.
whPn scienter is an element of thf' substantive violation sought
to be f'njoined. it must be proven before an injunction may
issue. But with respect to those provisions such as ~ 17 (a)
(2) and ~ 17 (a) (3). which may bf' violated f'ven in the absence
of scienter. nothing on the facr of ~ 20 (b) or ~ 21 (d) purports to impose an independent requirement of scif'nter. And
there is nothing in the legislative history of either provision to
suggest a contrary legislative intent.
This is not to say. however. that scienter has no bearing at
all on whether a district court should enjoin a person violating
or about to violate~ 17 (a) (2) or§ 17 (a)(3). In cases where
the Commission is seeking to enjoin a person "about to engage
in acts or practices which . . . unll constitute" a violation of
those provisions. the Commission must establish a sufficient
evidentiary predicate to show that such future violation may
occur. See SEC v. Commonwealth Chemical Co., 574 F. 2d
90, 98-100 (CA2 1978) (Friendly. J.); III L. Loss. supra, at
1976. An important factor in this regard is the degree of
intentional wrongdoing evident in a defendant's past conduct.
See SEC v. Wills, 472 F. Supp. 1250. 1273-1275 (DC 1978).
Moreover, as the Commission recognizes, a district court may
consider scienter or lack of it as one of the aggravating or
mitigating factors to be taken into account in exercising its
equitable discretion in deciding whether or not to grant
injunctive relief. And the proper exercise of equitable dis,.
cretion is necessary to ensure a "nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and private needs. 11
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 329.

III
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we hold that the
Commission is required to establish scienter as an element of
a civil enforcement action to enjoin violations of § 17 (a) (1)
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of the 1933 Act, § 10 (b) of the 1934 Act, and Rule 10b-5
promulgated under that section of the 1934 Act. We further
hold that the Commission need not establish scienter as an
element of an action to enjoin violations of § 17 (a)(2) and
§ 17 (a)( 3) of the 1933 Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the issuance of the injunction in this case in the misapprehension that it was not necessary to find scienter in order to
eupport an injunction under any of the provisions in question.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated,
and the case is remanded to the court for further proceedings
eonsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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